If such coercion were unnecessary, refraining from it would obviously be preferable, so the question arises, how to integrate social norms into principles of justice. I propose a consequentialist integration of social norms into the theory of justice, and defend this understanding against G. A. Cohen's nonconsequentialist egalitarianism and against liberal criticisms of that egalitarianism that target both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist versions of the doctrine.
NOZICK VERSUS PATTERNS
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick shrewdly observes that by his lights the maintenance of a favored pattern of distribution of goods among individuals would require continuous massive wrongful invasions of liberty.
1 Left to their own devices, individuals will choose to make deals and spend their resources in ways that will deviate from any nontrivial pattern initially established. To sustain the pattern, coercion would be necessary to prevent these many exercise of individual liberty. But on its face, this coercion is clearly morally illegitimate-so says Nozick. He illustrates the point by imagining that an initial distribution, assumed to be fair, is perturbed by a large number of free and 1. Distribution D1 is just (assumption).
2. Starting from D1, people freely and voluntarily transfer resources they own (violating no rights of third parties) to produce D2.
Any distribution that arises from a fair starting point by free and voluntary individual choices (violating no rights of third parties) is just.
4. D2 is just.
5. A distribution that does not exhibit the just pattern is unjust.
6. D1 uniquely exhibits the just pattern.
7. D1 differs from D2.
D2 is unjust.
Statement 4 contradicts statement 8, so something must give. Nozick suggests that the best way to eliminate the inconsistency is to reject premise 5, which insists that justice requires the maintenance of some pattern of distribution. Insistence on 5 leads to reductio ad absurdum.
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The argument has attracted many critics. The most straightforward response is to reject 3. Is one then committed to what is intuitively way too much freedom-restricting coercion? A first step toward removing the sting from this question is to observe that a favored distributive pattern might be loose, that is, capable of being exemplified by many different distributions, so maintaining a loose rather than a tight pattern might require correspondingly less, and possibly less onerous, restriction of individual freedom to act as one chooses.
The next observation is that a restriction of individual liberty can be well worth its cost from the perspective of every affected individual. Consider the loose pattern that consists of every member of a large nation paying a fair portion of her income in taxes to support a national defense establishment that protects every member from the menace of unjust aggression by foreign armies.
Coercion is onerous, no doubt, but sometimes its cost is outweighed by the gains it secures, and in fact we do not tend to experience as oppressive or unduly onerous coercion that manifestly secures more than corresponding benefits by a scheme that distributes costs and benefits fairly. 2 But as Nozick intends premise 3, it rules out coercion to secure the public good provision scheme just described. This suffices to show that premise 3 deserves rejection.
Nozick's argument, if it were successful, would defeat any coercive scheme to supply public goods. Even public goods such as national defense that most people regard as unproblematically the proper business of the state are swept aside by Nozick's broad broom. Consider an initial situation in which all 4 members of a society pay a certain amount per year to fund an army that defends against aggressive attack. Let the amount that individuals pay be fair according to your favorite conception of fairness. Absent coercion, left to their own free choice, people will choose to spend their money in ways that deviate from this initial distribution, assumed to be fair. Instead of contributing to national defense they do other things with their money. They make exchanges with other persons that are mutually agreeable, and some people make gifts to others. We end up at a new distribution of resources, in which the scheme to provide national defense is no longer funded, because people have freely chosen to use their money in other ways that preclude paying their share of the cost of the scheme. At this new distribution, the scheme to supply national defense disappears. But since the initial distribution ex hypothesi was fair, and the movement from the initial distribution to the new distribution came about entirely by individuals choosing to use resources they own in ways they see fit and that are voluntary on the part of all participants, there is no basis for objection to the new distribution, according to Nozick's argument. This argument remains unaffected by the observation that it might well be the case that everyone might be better off if the public good of national defense is coercively supplied by the state and funded by a fair tax scheme than would be the case if no such coercive scheme is in place and national defense is not provided.
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Another example that illustrates the justificatory power of the premise that any distribution is fair if it arises by free and voluntary choices of individuals from an initially fair starting point is provided by racial discrimination. From an initial status quo in which no one acts from racial hatred or hostility, a series of free and voluntary choices by individuals (that violate no one's Lockean libertarian rights) can lead to a state of affairs in which no white-skinned employer is willing to hire any black-skinned person for other than menial jobs and no white-skinned workers are willing to accept black-skinned persons as fellow employees unless the blacks are occupying the lowest rung of the skill hierarchy. 3 I suppose a stalwart Lockean libertarian might view this result as a surprising and hitherto unnoticed but powerful demonstration that racist discrimination can be fair. The rest of us will reason backward from the evident incorrectness of the conclusion and conclude that one or more of the premises that imply this conclusion must be faulty. 4 My suggestion is that the culprit is the premise already identified as troublesome, that whatever arises by free and voluntary choice from a fair starting point is fair.
For anyone not committed in advance to a Lockean libertarian position that holds that coercively taking away from any individual property she legitimately owns without securing her consent is wrong, the force of the Nozickian argument amounts to nothing more than a reminder that the institution of coercive schemes to supply public goods is a bad idea when the overall moral costs of the scheme exceed the moral benefits. best interpretation is that a person is better off when her life as a whole goes better for her, or in other words, when her well-being or welfare is higher. In turn the best construal of well-being holds that one gains more well-being, the more over the course of one's life one gains objectively valuable goods weighted by their importance. There is as it were an Objective List of such goods, and one's life goes better for one, the more one gains the entries on this list. 5 For purposes of this essay, it is not necessary to decide between competing accounts of human well-being. But I am going to help myself to the assumption that at least in principle, cardinal interpersonal comparisons of well-being are possible.
If interpersonal comparisons of well-being can be made, and the Pareto norm is accepted, and one accepts the idea that no individual is morally special and that one person's well-being gains and losses are just as important from the moral standpoint as anyone else's, then a stronger norm than Pareto should be acceptable. that corresponds to a legal rule to the same effect, I will be motivated to some extent to avoid tax evasion even when circumstances render it the case that I could violate the law by cheating on my taxes without incurring any significant risk of being caught and penalized. Social norms in this guise are a cheap substitute for police, the law courts, and prisons.
Free-standing social norms could in principle regulate matters that are unsuited to legal regulation. To some extent, this occurs. But social norms appear to sprout up like weeds and are difficult to control. Initiation of a social norm is not generally one of the options that is available to a social planner confronting some social problem. The norm against being a tattle-tale arises almost spontaneously in settings where children are supervised by adults. To some extent the norm operates as a shield for bullies; to some extent it protects a sphere of children's privacy. On balance I would guess it probably works for ill rather than good in most contexts, but there may not be any feasible way for 13 adults to extirpate it. Imperviousness to social design and shaping may characterize many social norms.
On the other hand, governments can influence the development of norms over time in direct and indirect ways. A social norm of racial discrimination can lose its hold on people when the behavior the norm dictates is legally prohibited.
A government might award prizes for public politeness and in other ways Mill has a famously spare view of the proper boundary line between conduct that should be regulated by society and conduct that should be let alone. Norms of equality lie on the wrong side of the line, he explicitly notes.
He reports that it is said that in the U.S., where sentiments of democratic equality are strong, the "feeling of the majority" is that "any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival" is "disagreeable." 11 He proceeds to speculate that if socialist opinions were to become widespread in society "it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour." 12 For Mill, the enforcement of social norms to this effect would amount to social tyranny, gross violation of the liberty principle.
Anyone who does not share Mill's strong empirical conviction that the social decision to countenance violations of his liberty principle will always fail to be utility-maximizing in the long run will have reason to reject his conviction that social norms that constrain inequality will always fail to be utility-maximizing in The project I am sketching adopts a particular idealization. One as it were imagines a social planner who can institute whatever laws, norms, and morals would be best in the society being considered-best in the sense of leading to best consequences as assessed by the social justice standard, with humans as we know them except that they are assumed to be socialized into these ideal practices. In this exercise it won't do to suppose that people can be induced by socialization to internalize norms of any degree of stringency and demandingness that is contemplated. Human nature is somewhat resistant to being shaped by norms and rules, and more resistant, within some range, as norms are imagined to be more stringent and demanding. The ideally best norms, laws, and obligation-generating morals are those that interact with this recalcitrant human nature so that social justice is maximized given this constraint.
This idealization is partial. If we imagine men and women as better than they in fact are and better than they could become under feasible socialization regimes, justice would be still better served. What I am calling the ideally just 
COHEN AGAINST RAWLS-EGALITARIANISM AGAINST LIBERALISM
The two-level view sketched here gives the social justice theorist a natural and plausible answer to interesting concerns articulated by G.A. Cohen in a series of essays. 19 Cohen focuses his discussion on a criticism of John Rawls's theory of justice, but the problem he raises seems to me to be more general.
Accordingly my formulation of the problem does not attempt to characterize with any care his dispute with Rawls.
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Rawls had proposed that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, the way that major institutions of a society interact to affect the life prospects of the members of the society. 20 Part of what this means is that the principles of justice primarily regulate the basic structure. According to this view, a society is just if and only if its basic structure conforms to the principles of justice. The principles of justice give rise to secondary requirements that apply to individual members of society. These requirements specify that if just institutions exist, individuals should support them and conform to their rules, and if just institutions do not exist, individuals should strive to bring them into existence if this can be done (or significant progress made) at reasonably small cost to themselves. The difficulty is that the principles of justice specify that certain moral goals should be achieved, and within a set of institutions that qualifies as just, these moral goals will be fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent depending on how individuals conduct their lives within these institutions. But there is no moral requirement in this scheme that dictates that individuals should do what they can or indeed do anything to see to it that the justice goals are fulfilled to a greater rather than a lesser extent. But there is a question as to whether this can make sense from the first-person standpoint of an individual living under just institutions who sees that she could do more to bring about the degree to which the society achieves the justice goals. On the view being considered, justice does not assign her any responsibility in this regard except the duty to support just institutions. But if she believes the justice goals are 22 justice goals, morally compelling, how can she be committed to them wholeheartedly without being committed thereby to regulating her personal life at least to some extent so that these morally compelling goals are fulfilled to a greater extent?
Consider prioritarianism. In the role of social justice standard, prioritarianism urges the maximization of human well-being weighted so that gains for a person count for more, the worse off in well-being the person is.
Suppose institutions are set to maximize this goal. A member of society whose condition is still extremely bad would seem to have a complaint against better off members of society who could do more to bring it about that the prioritarian goal is fulfilled to a greater degree, but do not. There they are, lazing at the beach, and frequenting expensive restaurants, and in other ways consuming resources that would do far more to advance weighted well-being if transferred to worseoff members of society. If it is claimed that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, there is a split between justice as a standard for institutions and justice as a standard for individual conduct. But what justifies the split in responsibility? On its face, the complaint of the worse off has merit.
But if we stipulate that the prioritarian society has set legal, social, and personal moral codes in a way and at a level that maximizes the achievement of prioritarian goals, there is a response to the complainant. If it were attempted to ratchet up the obligations of individuals, so that the complainant is made better off, the result would be that others are made worse off, who together 
Suppose one adopts the standpoint of the better off individual who does not act to benefit the worse off when according to prioritarian principle he ought to do so. If the society has set the standard of prioritarian obligation optimally, and obligation does not reach to cover this sort of case, then in these circumstances one will not feel obligated to do the act that benefits the worse off. One might well be aware that by prioritarian principle one ought to do so, but one is not motivated to do so, and very likely, one will not, and neither pangs of conscience nor social disapproval will sanction this wrong action. are all optimally set, it will still happen that someone will violate the law unjustifiably, for example, by committing a murder. We are assuming that the criminal justice system is arranged so that any changes in it intended to reduce the incidence of murders and other wrongful crimes would be counterproductive.
In this sense the rate of crime is optimal. None of this even begins to imply that the person who murders does not act wrongly and unjustly and that the society would be more just if such acts did not occur.
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This is correct, but yet the prioritarian (more broadly, consequentialist) egalitarian and the Cohen egalitarian significantly disagree. Further exploration is needed.
JUST SOCIETY, JUST INDIVIDUALS, AND THE ORIENTATION OF ONE'S WILL TOWARD JUSTICE
One possibility is that the disagreement concerns the specification of the justice goal. There is disagreement on this dimension. But it turns out the more basic disagreement lies elsewhere.
I believe that Cohen would regard the prioritarian just society as seriously flawed from the standpoint of fundamental justice. Justice according to Cohen requires that institutions and practice be arranged and that people should conduct themselves so that a strong principle of equality of opportunity is fully achieved. 23 The principle is satisfied just in case no disadvantage is suffered by one person compared to others except via the fault or choice of the individual who gets the short end of the stick. Justice requires the elimination of unchosen disadvantage. 24 Justice so characterized will conflict with the requirements of prioritarian morality, which implies that unchosen disadvantage should be imposed on people when and only when doing so maximizes priority-weighted Cohen clearly espouses communal reciprocity as morally valuable intrinsically, not merely for the sake of benefits its satisfaction might bring about as assessed by some other moral principle such as prioritarianism.
Cohen views the principle of communal reciprocity as requiring at least to some extent movement toward equality of outcome, and hence as tending toward a type of equality that justice as strong equality of opportunity does not per se require.
He illustrates the attraction of the principles of strong equality of opportunity and communal reciprocity by describing a camping trip among 27 friends in which all participants adopt a one for all and all for one attitude and eschew any claims to rights of private ownership in material possessions or in unearned talents or to the fruits of brute good luck that falls on some and not others. The camping trip as he describes it is carried out in a manner that satisfies the principles of strong equality of opportunity and communal reciprocity. Seen in this light, the camping trip is definitely morally attractive, he asserts. The serious question is not whether camping trip justice is really justice, but to what extent we can design and implement institutions and rules that would achieve camping trip justice on the large scale of an entire society, or ultimately on a world scale.
It may be that I am corrupted by prioritarian sympathy and bourgeois leanings, but I do not see that the principles that suffuse the ideal camping trip as he describes it are necessarily morally desirable. On camping trips I enjoy, some property may be regarded as collective but some important items of gear emphatically are the private property and personal responsibility of individuals.
It can be that lunches, snacks, insect repellant, hiking boots, climbing shoes, warm clothing and sleeping bags, and so on are better regarded as the personal responsibility of each participant to bring (of a quality and quantity that she chooses) for herself and herself alone. Given that a climbing rope can be severely damaged by careless use in ways that are sometimes hard to detect by subsequent inspection, I would not lend my rope to another and I would not climb with a partner who made a practice of lending his rope to others-that 28 would indicate a degree of imprudence that would rule out trusting partnership.
On some ventures, weaker members of the party may reasonably be left behind, even though their weakness is bad brute luck and no fault or choice of their own, because the gains to the stronger members from continuing alone outweigh the losses to the weaker. In other situations, stronger members might reasonably be required to make sacrifices for the sake of weaker members that definitely lower the stronger members below the level of expected benefit that Cohen's equal opportunity for advantage principle demands.
On a joint venture in which individual and collective decisions on matters from the trivial to the most momentous nearly always involve costs and benefits spilling over onto all group members, one wants each member of the party always to be making these decisions with a rough eye to the conclusion for action that a properly morally weighted cost and benefit calculation would yield.
The disposition to communal reciprocity that Cohen espouses can be imagined sometimes to be a cause of mutual benefit and sometimes to induce busybody intrusiveness that has a killjoy quality. In my view the disposition should be valued for its good effects, to the extent it produces them, not for its supposed inherent moral desirability. The same goes for the principle of strong equality of opportunity. In some cases insistence on it would render everyone worse off, and in other cases it would lessen priority-weighted benefit levels. In such cases we should without any regret let the principle go by the board. It should be 29 viewed as an instrument, valuable insofar as it guides us toward conduct that improves the quality of people's lives.
We are now in a position to understand the perspective from which Cohen might be expected to find morally unsatisfactory the state of affairs in which institutions, practices, norms, and obligations are set optimally from the prioritarian standpoint, and in which I assert that an individual who is badly off and whose condition might be improved if better off individuals acted as they ought to act (according to act consequentialism with prioritarianism setting the standard of good consequences) has no valid moral complaint. This world would be in a sense ideal from the prioritarian standpoint, though we might still wish that circumstances were different, so that the prioritarian goal might be still further advanced, and in particular we might regret that human nature is what it is, rather than cognitively and affectively superior. If it becomes possible in future genetically to redesign humans so prioritarian goals are better met, we ought to do so.
But the world that is-circumstances and human nature taken for granted-ideal from the prioritarian standpoint might well egregiously violate strong equality of opportunity and communal reciprocity. 26 Although Cohen might be prepared to tolerate deviation from communal reciprocity if the consequences of not tolerating deviation were sufficiently bad, to give this principle significant moral weight and to regard communal reciprocity as intrinsically morally desirable would be to hold that significant sacrifice of 30 priority-weighted human well-being would be worthwhile if needed to achieve better motivation as rated by the communal reciprocity norm.
In a prior essay, Cohen introduced the idea of a justificatory community. 27 This is a set of people among whom there prevails a norm of comprehensive justification. This is a term for which Cohen invents a definition. An argument for a policy that includes an appeal to the fact that people will behave or tend to behave in a certain way under the policy counts as a comprehensive justification of the policy only if the behavior in question is itself justified. Given these notions, it is straightforward that if a policy is justified in part by the fact that it is a device that copes reasonably with some people's tendency to a certain type of unjustified behavior, then that policy lacks a comprehensive justification. A society in which a criminal justice system aims to contain criminal behavior is pursuing a criminal justice aim that lacks a comprehensive justification.
Comprehensive justification can fail to obtain intrapersonally as well as interpersonally. Consider the hour-long time slices of myself over the course of a day. Let us say I could walk home via a scenic route adjacent to the ocean or via a nmondescript inland route past used car lots and warehouses and strip did not have to avoid the near occasions of sin, but things being as they are, the prudent policy produces the best feasible outcome given the human materials at hand.
Comprehensive justification and justificatory community do not qualify as intrinsically valuable on a prioritarian reckoning. If they happen to work to boost priority-weighted well-being totals, fine; but if not, also fine.
Cohen criticizes Rawls, and liberal theories of justice that are Rawlsian in the respect he criticizes, on the grounds that (1) for Rawls whether a society is just depends on the character of its basic structure not its social norms and prevalent personal ideals and (2) Here is another example to the same effect. It might be the case that children roughly perceive the extent to which their parents are disposed to care for them. Children might benefit from recognizing their parents' disposition to 33 favor them even when the favoritism would be unjust. The existence of the disposition then has two effects, the bad effect of leading parents to bad favoritism when the disposition is triggered, and the good effect of providing blanket reassurance to children. If the second effect outweighs the first, by prioritarian standards, the prioritarian favors the cultivation of the disposition.
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The point is simply that the ideal society, the ideally just society by prioritarian standards, the society in which priority is maximized, might be a society in which people's wills are not oriented toward justice, but toward the satisfaction of desires disapproved by justice.
LIBERALISM VERSUS PRIORITY
On the view I have sketched, the extent to which a society is just depends on the extent to which laws, institutions, practices, informal social norms, and moral obligations enforced only by pangs of conscience interact to affect the quality of individual lives. The just society is one that gives rise to outcomes that maximize the fulfillment of the social justice goal. The prioritarian interprets that goal as requiring the maximization of priority-weighted well-being. When these manipulable aspects of social life are set so that the prioritarian goal is maximally satisfied, the society qualifies as just. In this case the mechanisms that hold individuals accountable have done all that can be done to achieve justice goals.
The prioritarian acknowledges that in the society she is calling "just," individuals might yet not be behaving as they ought, by prioritarian standards. So the just society might be still more just, if behavior were to shift for the better. The The prioritarian view would hold that society is not just if these informal socializing agents are not set to maximize the priority goal. To revert to Mill's examples, it might be that a social norm that condemns profit-maximizing behavior on the part of people whose condition is already better than average and urges reasonable devotion to the common good would, if inculcated in members of society, operate over time to improve the extent to which the priority goal is fulfilled. In that case, the inculcation of this social norm would be 36 required by justice. In contrast, the liberal theory of justice condemns such intrusion into the private sphere.
Imagine that the government is considering raising the income tax rates faced by top earners. For the liberal, the tax rate should be set to maximize the justice goal, given the expected responses of the top earners to the various possible tax rates that might be imposed. For the prioritarian, one needs to consider the possibility that bringing about a change in social norms might increase the degree to which top earners would be willing to work at socially productive activities without requiring additional compensation. One should also consider the possibility that it is feasible to induce a change in prevalent philanthropy norms, such that lower tax rates for top earners would yield and expected more than compensating increase in philanthropical spending, so that in the end benefits that improve the quality of life of worse off persons would rise higher with lower taxes and more stringent norms of charitable giving. The prioritarian calculation takes into account strategies for achieving justice goals that the liberal theory excludes from consideration on a principled basis.
To focus attention on the point of disagreement, suppose that the liberal and her opponent agree that the correct specification of the social justice goal is prioritarianism.
The disagreement concerns what falls under the primary subject of justice. The liberal insists on a private zone of individual conduct. This is as it were a morally free zone, in the sense that it is not directly regulated by the principles of justice that regulates institutions and social practices. Social norms 37 and personal ideals fall in this private zone, and this placement is principled, not merely pragmatic.
But why tolerate lesser achievement of the agreed social justice goal?
This way of phrasing the question may be misleading, because for the liberal, the split between private and public is itself an aspect of social justice.
As the prioritarian sees it, the social justice goal is an all-encompassing moral goal. This goal encompasses all morally worthy aims and weights them at their correct value. From this standpoint, it will not do to insist that individual liberty is morally significant, and the moral division of responsibility between institutions and individual agents that the liberal theory dictates reflects the value of individual liberty. Individual liberty as a value that is achieved in the course of individual lives is an element, perhaps an important element, in human wellbeing. The value of liberty is taken into account at its correct value in the correct conception of individual well-being, some function of which is to be maximized according to prioritarian justice. (So if inducing a rise in the stringency of social norms would lessen individual freedom to a degree that is morally excessive, this would show up in the prioritarian calculation, and priorityweighted well-being would be decreased not increased by ratcheting up the social norm in that case.)
As so far stated, the conflict between the liberal and the consequentialist as I have described it might seem exaggerated. 29 For the liberal, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society--the way major institutions 38 interlock to affect life prospects. The justice requirement on individuals is that they support the institutions of a just or nearly just society if it exists and work to bring it about if the existing society they inhabit is unjust. But nothing said so far rules it out that the choice of a just basic structure should take into account the impact on the basic structure on social norms. Suppose we could choose basic structure #1, which includes low taxes and thereby brings about strongly egalitarian social norms, or basic structure #2, which is otherwise the same except its tax rate is higher and its tax rate somehow brings about less strongly egalitarian social norms. The justice goal is better fulfilled if basic structure #1 is chosen, so #1 is the more just basic structure. On this construal, people's legal behavior within just institutions is neither just nor unjust, but the basic structure, if just, merits that assessment in part because of the effects of the basic institutions on the formation and spread of social norms and thereby its effect on behavior.
If this line of thought is correct, the conflict between the consequentialist and the liberal diminishes in scope. Here's a residual possible conflict. Suppose the basic structure is optimally set from the standpoint of maximizing the satisfaction of the principle of justice. But the social norms thereby induced are not optimal. People let us say could act in concert in ways that would ratchet up the norms without lessening compliance to an offsetting extent. Then they should act in those ways, and the social norms are not yet optimal. The practical policy implications of this residual difference might be slight, though this does not reduce the interest of the theoretical disagreement.
The liberal position as now interpreted does not support the robust boundary between public and private and the wide liberty to act as one chooses within the private sphere that I had initially associated with contemporary liberal doctrine. But perhaps that doctrine with its insistence on a robust private sphere is nevertheless defensible on other grounds. The best attempt to articulate such grounds of which I am aware appeals to the Rawlsian ideal of well-ordered social cooperation. 30 Andrew Williams makes such an appeal: In a well-ordered society, each member embraces the same public conception of justice, and complies with its requirements, and these facts are common knowledge among the members of society. The conception is public in that its content is available for anyone to inspect. The conception is public in a further sense. It is a norm that regulates public institutional rules-rules that are known or knowable by all and that state requirements that are clear and unambiguous. Moreover, the degree to which people comply with these public rules is also known or knowable by all.
This publicity requirement cannot be satisfied by social norms and personal ideals (that fix the individual's sense of moral obligation) as envisaged by the prioritarian consequentialist. These may well be vague and ambiguous in their requirements. Also, the degree to which people comply may be difficult to discern and impossible to gauge with any accuracy. Moreover, the norms and ideals may well function best from a prioritarian standpoint if they have these features that violate publicity.
One might also mention that the burden of compliance with social norms and personal ideals may fall very capriciously and arbitrarily. By luck some people will find themselves deferring to a peer group that has lax attitudes to prevailing social norms, and some people find that their close associates are stern enforcers of these same norms. Social norms and personal ideals will obviously bear more heavily on people who are conscientious and scrupulous than on people whose consciences are happy go lucky. These expectable features of the prioritarian just society violate the ideal of the well-ordered society.
Still, why should well-orderedness trump the goal of maximizing priorityweighted well-being? The conflict between the liberal and the prioritarian consequentialist only arises when one must choose between a society that is more well-ordered but affords people a better quality of life (weighted by the prioritarian distributive standard). Indeed, why should one accept any trade-off at all between these goals? In many cases the fact that a society is manifestly ruled by rules that people agree are fair will boost the degree to which priorityweighted well-being can be achieved. But when this is not the case, I fail to see why well-orderedness should be thought to have independent weight. Suppose that we could arrange society to achieve one of two outcomes. In one, two babies who otherwise would die premature deaths are enabled to live normal 41 lives. In the other, the society is slightly more well-ordered. The rules regulating social practices include fewer that are vague in their requirements.
But except for these stated differences, in all other respects the two societies are identical. I for one would unquestioningly opt for the society where the babies avoid premature death. One might say the liberal attaches intrinsic moral importance to the achievement of procedural values.
Other things being equal, it is surely better that a social rule be drafted so that whether individuals comply or not and hence whether they should incur sanctions or not can be verified. But other things are often not equal. For example, a norm against littering in remote wilderness areas of national parks is
fairly clear in what it requires, but monitoring and policing would be too costly to be feasible. Suppose the norm is effective; most people do not litter; the beauty of the wilderness areas is maintained. I deny that infeasibility of enforcement necessarily means that it is bad that the norm should exist or bad for the government to promote it.
The ideal of publicity reveals a further aspect not yet mentioned. 31 According to the liberal, a truly just society pursues only policies that reasonable persons accept. In a diverse modern society with civil liberties, reasonable people will diverge widely in their ways of life and comprehensive conceptions of morality and value. Hence the liberal seeks a political conception of justice, a conception of fair social cooperation that all reasonable people will converge in accepting despite their many disagreements. In the attempt to fashion a political 42 conception that can attract the endorsement of all reasonable members of society, the scope of justice should be limited. The more matters that justice principles regulate, the greater the chances that some reasonable people will view these matters from very different perspectives and fail to agree on principles appropriate for their regulation. A division between public and private with significant aspects of social life set on the private side of the line is a useful strategy for delimiting a political conception of justice that can provide a basis of social unity in a diverse society. Just as a political conception of justice must shed controversial norms that some reasonable people will reject, it must confine itself to norms that regulate a system of public institutional rules. After all, 
